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THE COURT AND THE CHANGING
CONSTITUTION: A DISCUSSION
Vincent Bonventre:
Welcome to this afternoon's session: The Court and the
Changing Constitution: A discussion. By discussion we mean
something more akin to a free-for-all. We have various different
topics here: we have appointments, we have separation of
powers, we have disincorporation (I have no idea what that might
be), and we have the exclusionary rule. And among the common
denominators I see here are complaints about court of appeals'
jurisprudence and complaints about all kinds of stuff, even
complaints about one another.
I just told Professor Carl Swidorskil at the break that his
dissertation on the court of appeals' appointment process, the
changeover from elections to the so-called merit selection system,
was the first I had ever read. So, Carl, go to it.
Carl Sividorski:
I would like to thank the people who have convened this and
for inviting me. When they invited me they asked me to be brief
and to try to say something which would get a free flowing,
provocative discussion going, and then they asked me to talk
about judicial selection. My immediate reaction was that is not
that exciting of a topic. The political science literature has sort of
had a consensus about judicial federalism for a long period of
time.
1. Carl Swidorski is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the
College of Saint Rose in Albany, New York and previously taught at
Northeastern University in Boston. Professor Swidorski has a particular
interest in public law, bureaucratic politics and political theory.
TOURO LAW REVIEW
Then I remembered this Law Review article I wrote that Barry
referred to over ten years ago. 2 And one of the former chief
judges of the court of appeals responded to that article in judicial
selection by saying it was a "false and defamatory" alleged
description of the New York State Commission on Judicial
Nomination and an affront to the members of the commission. 3 I
thought maybe I will say something that is provocative.
Another letter I got in response to that article was from an
executive director of one of the good government organizations
who suggested the article was filled with factual inaccuracies.
And a third response from another sitting judge at the time
suggested that the advocates of the elected systems were pointing
to that article as evidence that a strong advocate of merit selection
had changed its mind. It was also news to me that I had been an
advocate of merit selection or that I had changed my mind. So
maybe I will say something that will lead to some discussion
2. Carl Swidorski, Judicial Selection Reform and the New York Court of
Appeals: Illusion or Reality, 55 N.Y. ST. B.J. 10 (July 1983). The following
describes the aforementioned article:
One of the quieter developments in state government over the past
[fifty] years has been the accomplishments of the judicial reform
movement. A substantial majority of states have instituted changes
in their judicial systems. While the judicial reform movement has
supported a variety of changes, its most visible and controversial
proposals have centered on its attempt to change the method of
selecting judges to some variant of the Merit Plan. The campaigns
for change from an allegedly political selection system to a
supposedly more professional one have generated considerable
political controversy in many states and have raised a series of
questions ranging from the appropriate role for the judiciary to play
in a democratic society to discussions of the increasing
professionalization and bureaucratization of the American judiciary
and the larger political system.
Id. at 10-11.
3. See Carl Swidorski, Judicial Selection Reform - The Author's Reply to
His Critics, 55 N.Y. ST. B.J. 22 (October 1983). Professor Swidorski begins
his "reply to his critics" by stating: "Former Chief Judge Desmond charges
that my characterization of the activities of the State Commission on Judicial
Nomination is 'false and defamatory' and that an investigation by the editor of
the New York State Bar Journal would have discovered its 'total falsity."' id.
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depending on what the people in the audience want to talk about,
given the variety of topics they have here.
I have four basic conclusions I just want to throw out. I will
not offer too much evidence to support them. See if questions
lead to that.
For those who are not familiar, for the court of appeals, New
York State made a constitutional change in 1977 from an elective
system which often functioned as a gubernatorial appointment
system, or generally functioned as a gubernatorial appointment
system, and political parties' appointment system, to a so-called
merit plan of judicial selection.4
My first conclusion is that merit selection has had very little
affect on the kinds of individuals selected for the New York State
Court of Appeals. 5 The evidence for this in New York, both
evidence that I have done research on and other individuals, tends
to conform with over thirty years of evidence in the political
science profession looking at a variety of states which comes to
basically the same conclusion.
For example, in New York State, if we look at the individuals
selected to the New York Court of Appeals on some
characteristics, under merits, their average age is 56.4.6 Under
the so-called non-merit, 56.7
4. Swidorski, supra note 2, at 13.
5. Id. at 14. Professor Swidorski contends that "the new selection method
has not lived up to the reformers' professed expectations that 'better' or
,superior' judges would be picked and that politics would be removed from
the process of selection." Id.
6. In an unpublished paper entitled "Judicial Selection to the New York
State Court of Appeals, 1950-1996: What Have We Learned?", Professor
Swidorski provides the following table illustrating certain characteristics of
Court of Appeals Judges under the "merit" and "non-merit" selection
processes for the years 1950 through 1996:
Characteristics "Non-Merit" "Merit"
(N=23)[a] (N = 14)[bl
Mean Age at time of Selection 56 56.4
Previous Judicial Experience 78% 93 %
Mean Years of Judicial Experience 14.8 16
Appellate Division Experience 48% 50 %
19961
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In terms of years of judicial experience, under the merit
system, they now have 16 years of judicial experience on the
average. 8 Under the elective system, they had 15 years of judicial
experience on the average. 9 Under the merit system, 50 percent
have been on the appellate division; under the elective system, 48
percent were on the appellate division. 10 In fact, under the
elective system one out of five judges was a presiding judge of
the appellate division and none have been under the merit
system. 11
On those types of criteria it suggests to me that we are not
really getting significantly different types of judges. And this
evidence supports a lot of other evidence in the profession.
The second criteria I looked at was who is influential in the
selection process today as opposed to under the elective system.
Under the elective system, my conclusions were that the
Presiding Justice of Appellate Division 22 % 0%
Judicial Department
First 22% 36%
Second 22% 21%
Third 22% 21%
Fourth 35% 21%
Party Affiliation
Democrat 52% 64%
Republican 48% 29%
Independent 0% 7%
[a] Only twenty-one judges were selected to the Court between 1950
and 1977. However the table includes two other judges who sat on
the Court during this period because their presence, with their
accompanying set of background characteristics, was a factor in the
decisions made about other selections to the Court. These two
judges were initially selected in 1934 and 1949.
[b] Judge Kaye is counted twice. She was appointed an Associate
Judge in 1983 and elevated to Chief Judge in 1993.
Carl Swidorski, Judicial Selection to the New York State Court of Appeals,
1950-1996: What Have We Learned?, at 12.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Swidorski, supra note 2, at 14.
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governors were the most significant political actors in the
appointment process, followed by political party leaders, in that
case political party leaders primarily of the democratic party
since we had a period of republican gubernatorial leadership, and
then the candidates, themselves, were the third most important
participants in the selection process. 12
I see basically the same pattern under the merit selection
process. Governors remain the dominant actors in the
appointment process. Other political party leaders remain very
important, partly because they are institutionalized in the
Commissions on Judicial Reform, themselves, partly because
political activists are among those appointed to the Commissions
on Judicial Nomination. And, third, the candidates themselves
remain important.
It is very rare that anyone is selected to the court of appeals
unless they have made some effort to get selected to the court of
appeals and let their name be known. The range of effort can
vary quite a bit from a minimal effort to organizing fairly active
lobbying campaigns on behalf of particular justices or judges.
And the third criteria I looked at was what type of factors have
been important under both selection systems. And under the old
elective system, my research suggested that there was a threshold
level of judicial competence expected of people who are going to
be appointed to the court of appeals. 13 After that threshold level
of judicial competence was met, then a variety of political factors
were taken into consideration. 14 And since it was an elective
system, the factors included the affect that candidate might have
on the state wide ticket in terms of balancing the ticket or in
some years in terms of heading the ticket.
There are political considerations of other positions that will be
opened up at lower levels which will lead to more patronage
12. Id.
13. Id. at 15.
14. In his article, Professor Swidorski provides examples with respect to
the replacement of a judge with another of the same political affiliation. Id. He
further contends that "lobbying, patronage considerations, and the attempted
exertion of political influence were all part of judicial appointments.]" Id.
19961 139
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appointments. In some cases it will be promote so and so to the
court of appeals.
Those considerations were normal under the elective system,
and then there are what I call political representational
considerations. It was important during that period of time, at
least according to almost everyone I interviewed, that the court
have some rough political party balance, that the court have
geographic balance in terms of the four departments of the State
of New York, and that the court have religious balance in terms
of the three major faiths: Jewish, Catholic, and Protestant.
Under the merit selection plan, I see that similar factors
probably had operation, although I have not done the kind of
extensive interview that would lead me to have a firmer
conclusion about it, but it is clear that gender is an issue under
the current system. It is clear that race is an issue. It is clear that
ethnicity at times becomes an issue.
And if we look at the distribution patterns, in terms of
geography, under the old system 22% of the judges were from
the first, second, and third departments, and 35% from the fourth
department, which shows some interest in keeping representation
for all departments on the court and keeping it in some balance. 15
Under the new system, we have 36% from the first department,
and then 21 % from the other three departments which, again,
suggests some consideration and interest in geographical
representation. In terms of party affiliation, under the old system,
52% of the appointments were democrats; 48% republican. 16
Roughly equal. Under the new system, interestingly enough,
64% of the appointments have been democrats and 29% have
been republicans. 17 That difference probably is accounted for by
the different political affiliations of the Governor in the two
respective systems, and the fact that at the time merit selection
was put in place the court had a slight republican nomination and
has now switched to a slight democratic one.
15. See supra note 6.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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So, my conclusion, again, on that basis, is that the change in
selection systems has not had a significant affect in terms of an
interest in political representation as an issue to be considered in
who we appoint as court of appeals' judges. Some of the relative
importance of the different representational factors may have
shifted. Religion does not appear to be as important today, but
nonetheless that appears to be a consideration.
My final conclusion is that in terms of policy making, and in
terms of the life support in area New Yorkers, the change in
judicial selection really has not meant a lot.
I have one other thing I can toss out on the table which perhaps
will lead to some discussion. One of the judges who responded to
my earlier work suggested that while he did not like the tone of it
he agreed with its conclusions, but his comment was the problem
with the merit system in New York was not the merit system
itself but the kind we had adopted. His argument was when the
appointment of nomination commissioned members is left to
political figures, political factors in the judicial selection process
will not disappear simply because the appointees will continue
their relationships with the appointers. The solution, in my view,
is to divorce appointment of commissioned members as far from
the political process as possible. 18
And then he goes on to suggest that as examples of non-
political members of the Judicial Nomination Commission we
could have the president of the New York State Bar, the president
18. The mechanics of the selection process is as follows:
The plan ... provide[s] for a bipartisan screening committee, the
State Commission on Judicial Nomination, composed of twelve
members. No more than six individuals can be registered members
of a given political party. Four members are appointed by the
governor, four by the Chief Judge, and one each by the majority and
minority leaders of the State Senate and Assembly. The Commission
makes recommendations for Court of Appeals vacancies to the
governor who must appoint one of the individuals recommended. In
the case of the Chief Judge, the Commission recommends seven
individuals while for Associate Judge positions it recommends three
to five individuals. The person nominated by the governor must
then be confirmed by the New York State Senate.
Swidorski, supra note 2, at 13-14.
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of the League of Women Voters, deans of law schools and
etceteras (whatever etceteras is). My initial reaction to that is,
having spent twenty some years in academia, that I am not
certain deans are very non-political, and I am not too certain that
presidents of the New York State Bar Association are very non-
political, so my initial reaction to that suggestion of, again,
removing politics from the process is skepticism.
And I will leave it there.
Vincent Bonventre:
He referred to the judges of the court of appeals as justices,
which reminds me of a story of a friend of mine, Dick Farrell,
from Brooklyn Law School, who was down arguing at the United
States Supreme Court and insisted on referring to the justices as
judges. Finally, I don't know whether it was a red-faced
Rehnquist or Scalia said, you know, "we are justices," to which
Dick Farrell responded: "Well, in the New York Court of
Appeals they are judges. I figure if it's good enough for them,
it's good enough for you."
Barry Latzer:
A footnote to that: The Constitution says "judges" of the
Supreme Court. 19
Vincent Bonventre:
Next we have Professor James Gardner 20 who has kind of
made a career out of starting or inciting riots in the State
Constitutional Law subfield. He is going to talk to us today about
separation of powers jurisprudence in the court of appeals.
James Gardner:
19. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The language referred to states: "The
Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts. . . ." Id.
20. Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law;
B.A. 1980, Yale University; J.D. 1984, University of Chicago.
142 [Vol 13
CHANGING CONSTITUTION
Well, if what Rob Heverly said at the end of last session didn't
start a riot, I am not going to start one here.
The basic point that I want to make is that not much has
changed at the court of appeals in terms of its state constitutional
jurisprudence. There have been some superficial, cosmetic
changes, but nothing of any substance. And I want to make that
point by talking about the separation of powers jurisprudence. It
seems to me that the separation of powers is a bellwether for state
constitutional adjudication. There is no Fourteenth Amendment
influence, there is no policy considerations favoring uniformity
or lack of uniformity. With federal doctrine, there is no search
and seizure area that police have to cooperate with. The way a
state chooses to structure its own government is a completely
independent decision that federal law has no influence over and
as a result the field is wide open. The adjudication occurs in
something approaching the purest form in this area and others
like it.
If that is the case, then the court of appeals' separation of
powers cases bode ill for its state of constitutional adjudication in
general.
The case I want to talk about is a case from last term: Bourquin
v. Cuomo.2 1 In Bourquin, the court of appeals upheld an
executive order by Governor Cuomo that created an outfit called
the Citizens Utility Board, the CUB.22 Here is what happened.
The Governor decided that the interests of residential utility
consumers were inadequately represented before the Public
Utility Commission which sets rates that affect everybody. And
so the Governor went to the legislature and said, "This is a
problem. What you should do is to create the CUB to protect
residential consumers' interest." And the legislature said, "We
don't want to." And so the Governor said, "No problem. I will
do it myself." He issued an executive order. At least judging by
the court of appeals' handling of the issue, what the executive
21. 85 N.Y.2d 781, 652 N.E.2d 171, 628 N.Y.S.2d 618 (N.Y. 1995).
22. Id. at 783, 652 N.E.2d at 172, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 619. The purpose of
Executive Order No. 141 is to protect the interests of residential customers
when dealing with public utilities. Id. (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.
tit. 9, § 4.141 (1995)).
1996]
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order did was to create or authorize the creation of this agency
and to give it access to state mailings. 23
Now, the separation of powers' argument against this is pretty
obvious. It is an example of the Governor legislating. The court
of appeals upheld the executive order.24 Their reasoning was that
even though there is no specific legislation authorizing the
Governor to do this, if we scour New York law we find
indications that the legislature has abstractly expressed a goal to
protect consumers. 25
We know that because the legislature created the Consumer
Protection Board, which is an executive agency designed to
promote the interest of consumers. 26 The court of appeals held
23. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 787, 652 N.E.2d at 174, 628 N.Y.S.2d at
621. The court found a similarity between the instant case and Clark v.
Cuomo, 66 N.Y.2d 185, 486 N.E.2d 794, 495 N.Y.S.2d 936 (1985), in that
both executive orders at issue did not articulate specific policies. Bourquin, 85
N.Y.2d at 787, 652 N.E.2d at 174, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 621. Compare Boreali v.
Axelrod, 130 A.D.2d 107, 518 N.Y.S.2d 440 (3d Dep't), aff'd, 71 N.Y.2d 1,
517 N.E.2d 1350, 523 N.Y.S.2d 464 (1987) (finding that in creating a
comprehensive code to govern tobacco smoking in public areas, the Public
Health Council usurped the Legislature's power by employing a scheme which
attempted to strike a balance among health concerns, costs and privacy
interests which is a unique legislative function); Rapp v. Carey, 58 A.D.2d
918, 396 N.Y.S.2d 805 (3d Dep't 1977), aff'd, 44 N.Y.2d 157, 375 N.E.2d
745, 404 N.Y.S.2d 565 (1978) (determining that an executive order created by
the Governor which attempted to regulate certain state employees by
prohibiting service in a political party office and regulating outside
employment and activity was unconstitutional because the order could not be
exacted against state employees who were not subject to removal by the
Governor, did not prescribe legislation relating to conflicts of interest and
attempted to fill a legislative function by addressing an area of public concern);
Broidrick v. Lindsay, 48 A.D.2d 639, 368 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1st Dep't 1975),
aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 641, 350 N.E.2d 595, 385 N.Y.S.2d 265 (1976) (holding
that regulations enacted by the Mayor of the City of New York which required
construction contractors meet mandated minority employment percentages
were invalid because they lacked legislative authority, were inconsistent with
applicable state statutes and because they invoked a percentage which was
unconstitutional).
24. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 783, 652 N.E.2d at 172, 628 N.Y.S.2d at
619.
25. Id. at 786, 652 N.E.2d at 174, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
26. Id. at 785, 652 N.E.2d at 174, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 621.
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that all the Governor was doing was executing or implementing a
generally expressed legislative desire to protect the interests of
consumers just simply executing the law. 27
Now, in order to reach that result, the court had to take a very
broad view of what it means to execute the law, or, alternatively,
it took a very broad view of what the reach of positive law is
with the unusual and broad conception of positive law. 28 The
reason it had to take one or both of these views is because the
Governor can implement the law not only by carrying out the
things that the legislature has told the Governor to carry out, but
also by carrying out things that the legislature has not told the
Governor to do, and in fact by doing things the legislature has
decided they do not want to do. 29
Now, obviously on the federal level something like that would
violate the separation of powers, but big deal. We are talking
about the New York State Constitution. The State of New York
is free to structure its government however it sees fit and to take,
if necessary, and if desired, a very broad view of executive
power. In principle, there is nothing wrong with this decision;
however, in practice, there is something at least potentially
wrong with the decision, that is the New York State Constitution.
The New York State Constitution is filled with suggestions that
executive power in this state should be construed narrowly and, if
anything, more narrowly than executive power on the federal
level.
27. Id. at 787, 652 N.E.2d at 175, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
28. Id. at 785, 652 N.E.2d at 173, 628 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
29. C.f., e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (explaining that it would usurp the function of the legislature if the
President acts after Congress expressly considered and rejected such action);
American Power and Light Co. v. Securities & Exch. Comm'n, 329 U.S. 90
(1946) (holding that Congress shall not be vague when authorizing the
President to act since a reviewing court must be able to ascertain the precise
legislative policy of such action); Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1977) (providing that courts must set aside government actions not in
accordance with law). But see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)
(sustaining executive order on the issue of whether the President may suspend
and settle pending court claims of Americans against non-Americans which
issue has historically received Congressional acquiescence).
1996] 145
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The court based its interpretation on Article 4, Section 1 of the
State Constitution,30 which is the executive power provision from
central casting: "The executive power shall be vested in the
Governor .. 31
The problem is if you read a little further into the document
you will see that is a bit of an exaggeration. In fact, the executive
power of the State of New York is vested in the Governor and an
independent attorney general, 32 and an independently elected
comptroller, 33 and independently elected district attorneys, 34 and
independently elected sheriffs. 3 5 It is disbursed and splintered
and divided.
All right. Why is that? Well, in most states, and most states do
have a splintered executive in this manner, in most states what
you would find is this occurred generally during the progressive
reform era of the late Nineteenth Century and was done because
of a suspicion that the progressives had of concentrated executive
power because of its potential for corruption.
In New York, actually, the tradition of distrust for centralized
executive power is much, much older. And what you can find
(this is what disturbs me about the court's opinion) is that under
the very first constitution, the 1777 Constitution, the legislature
had the power to appoint virtually all executive officials. 3 6 That
was continued through the 1821 Constitution. 37
It was changed in 1846 in that these offices that had been
appointed by the legislature now were made to be filled by
30. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
31. Bourquin, 85 N.Y.2d at 784, 652 N.E.2d at 173, 628 N.Y.S.2d at
620 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 1).
32. Id. (citing N.Y. CONST. art. V, § 1).
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 13(a)).
35. Id.
36. N.Y. CONST. pmbl., arts. 22, 23, 26 (1777), reprinted in THE
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 2623 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed. 1909)
[hereinafter "Thorpe"].
37. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 6 (1821), reprinted in Thorpe, supra note 36,
at 2644.
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popular election. 38 So you had people like the Secretary of State,
the Attorney General, the Treasurer, and a whole variety of
people being independently elected. But the point is that the
Governor never had the powers and was stripped of them. The
Governor never had these powers in the State of New York.
All right. What can you make of this? Well, one thing that you
can make of this is you can say one of two things. First, you can
say these powers in the State of New York were never considered
to be executive powers and as a result what that tells us is that in
the State of New York the people have traditionally taken a
narrow view of what executive power is. 39 Second, you can say
in New York we have the same view of executive power but we
are deeply, deeply distrustful in the tradition, going all the way
back to the revolution, of concentrated executive power.
To that you can add some other things that the court declined to
address. For example, the legislature in the state is part-time, the
Governor is full-time. That really tips the balance of power
greatly in favor of the Governor. Or how about this, the
Governor in the state has an item veto,40 giving the Governor a
much greater degree of control over the content of legislation
than, let us say, the president has over the content of federal
legislation. All these things seem to make up a plausible case that
executive power in the State of New York should be construed
narrowly.
Now, I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not saying that
Bourquin is necessarily wrong. There could be answers to all of
the things I raised that could be distinguished away. I do not
know. The point is that the court of appeals did not even make
38. N.Y. CONST. art. V, §§ 1-4 (1846), reprinted in Thorpe, supra note
36, at 2680-81.
39. The limits of the executive power is not clear and certain. For
instance, the prosecutorial function may be considered executive, as in the
Federal Constitution, see, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). or
judicial, see, e.g., MISS. CONST. art VI, § 173 (1890) (placing state attorney
general in judicial branch). See Scott M. Matheson, Constitutional Status and
Role of the State Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J. L. & Pub. PoucY 1 (1993);
Stephanie A.J. Dange, Note, Is Prosecuting a Core Executive Function?
Morrison v. Olson and the Framers' Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069 (1990).
40. N.Y. CONST. art. IV, §7.
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the attempt and did not even acknowledge the existence of these
other factors of the constitution and of the separation of powers.
In fact, what it did was import a set of federal bromides and
platitudes about separation of powers and proceed to apply them
to the New York State Constitution as though the document were
an appropriate place in which to apply those concepts, and it is
not because it is very different in significant ways.
So, this I find disappointing. I find disappointing that after at
least a decade of criticism, the court of appeals has done really
nothing in terms of changing its ways except perhaps in the very
highest profile individual rights case. Although, Rob's
presentation says that is not even the case there. Certainly in the
meat and potatoes areas, like separation of powers and
governmental structure, things are no different than they were
before the court was criticized.
Thank you.
Vincent Bonventre:
Thank you, Jim. You accused the court of relying on bromides
and platitudes. Bellacosa accuses them of that every session. Next
we have Professor Barry Latzer4 1 who, by the way, has a
recently published book on state constitutional criminal
procedure. 42 It is a magnificent book. He is going to discuss with
us disincorporation. We will find out what that is.
Barry Latzer:
I want to thank the Government and Law Center for inviting
me and especially I want to thank Professor Bonventre, who has
been such a gracious host.
Unlike most of my predecessors, I have come to praise the state
courts *and not to bury them. In fact, I rather think that there are
some implications from state constitutionalism that we have not
yet considered, I mean indications for federal constitutional law.
41. Barry Latzer is a Professor of Government at John Jay College of
Criminal Justice, City University of New York.
42. BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
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If you study, the way I have, the vast bulk of state
constitutional criminal procedure cases, over the whole nation,
not just in New York, I think you cannot help but be impressed at
the extent of the redundancy between state and federal
constitutional criminal procedure.
I would now suggest that by this next century, which is not far
off, most federal criminal procedure rights will have been
protected on the basis of state constitutional law in most states in
the United States. So I wish to raise this provocative question
with you, and given the time constraints I probably will not get
very much beyond raising the question, but I am going to suggest
what I think the implications are with this development.
If we have such redundancy between state constitutional law
and federal constitutional law, and if the state courts are proven
rights' sensitive agents, as I think they are, then why do we need
the federal floor? Why do we need the same level of federal
constitutional protection?
Now, I know this is a radical question. Just to ask the question
raises havoc. The assumption is that the federal floor is
absolutely essential because it protects basic fundamental rights.
Protects them from whom, however? When the federal floor was
first laid, the assumption was that the state courts were either
unwilling, unable, or incompetent to protect the defendants'
rights or anyone else's rights. That assumption has been eroded if
not demolished.
We have ample empirical proof that it has been eroded. 43 If,
for instance, you were to examine the so-called parity debate,
43. Barry Latzer, The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court
"Revolution," 74 JUDICATURE 190 (1991). There are "more than 600 opinions
that go beyond the federal minimum standards on individual rights issues." Id.
(quoting Resnick, 7zis Court's a Backwater No More, NAT'L L.J., May 28,
1990, at 1, 30). See, e.g., Public Health Trust of Dade County v. Wons. 541
So. 2d 96 (1989) (holding that the state's interests were insufficient to
overcome a patient's right to refuse a life-saving blood transfusion based on
the patient's religious beliefs); Riley v. State, 511 So. 2d 282 (1987)
(declaring that evidence should be suppressed where the defendant had a
reasonable expectation of privacy); Shakman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148 (1989)
(stating that the state has the burden of demonstrating that the method and
means used in phone-tapping was the least intrusive means possible); Bostic v.
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which involved whether or not federal habeas corpus should be
maintained or should be altered, we have even more empirical
proof from state constitutional law making itself. If the state
courts are willing to protect rights on the basis of state
constitutional law, as I claim they have, in fact, if they are
willing to exceed federal requirements, as they so often do, I do
not see how you can argue that the federal floor is needed to
protect against the state courts. 44
In short, I think there is an abundance of empirical proof that
the state courts are now proving rights protective. 45 Now, where
do we go from here? I do not want to make the leap yet that just
because the state courts are proven rights' protectors we do not
need a federal floor. I know we have a long way to go to reach
that point. In fact, I am not going to argue we do not need a
federal floor. What I am going to argue is that we do not need
some of the planks in the federal floor.
How can we approach such an argument? To do so I believe
you have to go back to the theory of incorporation itself. Now,
incorporation, as you all know, means certain rights are in the
Bill of Rights, those rights that are deemed fundamental rights,
State, 554 So. 2d 1153 (1990) (holding that an unlawfully detained bus
passenger's subsequent consent to search his luggage did not overcome taint of
illegal police conduct).
44. Latzer, supra note 41, at 190. "[F]or every state high court decision
repudiating U.S. Supreme Court doctrine there are at least two cases endorsing
it." Id.
45. Id. at 191. Professor Latzer states:
[l]t should be emphasized that this not a situation where the
Supreme Court's relatively insignificant doctrines have been
approved, and its significant ones rejected; there is a mix of
important and not-so-important cases on both sides of the equation.
Moreover, any suggestion that the "more important" state courts,
the ones that set the trends for the rest, are more rejectionist, and
that therefore rejectionism is the wave of the future, is also
unsupported by the evidence .... [W]hile some leadership courts
(e.g., New York and Oregon) are fairly rebellious, other vanguard
tribunals (e.g., Connecticut, New Hampshire and New Jersey) have
very high rates of approval of the output of the Burger/Rehnquist
majority.
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are a part of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process, and therefore
are incumbent upon the states. After the 1960's had ended, most
of the rights provisions in the Bill of Rights had been
incorporated.
The Supreme Court of the United States then assumed that all
of the laws concerning these rights, all of the subsidiary rules
affecting these provisions, all of what came to be known as the
bag and baggage of the fundamental rights, was a part of due
process and was also to be incorporated. 4 6
Notice that I said the Supreme Court assumed that is so,
because that is exactly what they did. They assumed it without
examining the issue. Now, in what I call the post incorporation
era, the period of time after the 1960's, after the fundamental
rights of the Bill of Rights were incorporated, the Supreme
Court, without reflection or without examination, simply
assumed that every Fourth and Fifth and Sixth and Eighth
Amendment decision that it made also involved a Fourteenth
Amendment due process decision. It just assumed it. It never saw
fit to have to prove it. Why? Because Justice Brennan said we are
not going to have a watered down version of the Bill of Rights
applied to the states. 47
Now, there is another development in the post incorporation
era. During the post incorporation era, the Supreme Court
announced a number of criminal procedure rules that it said had
questionable basis in the Bill of Rights. I am referring, of course,
to the Miranda rule. 48 I am referring, of course, to the Fourth
46. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937). Writing the
opinion for the Court, Justice Cardozo explains how the guarantees "have been
taken over from the earlier articles of the Federal Bill of Rights and brought
within the Fourteenth Amendment by a process of absorption." Id.
47. See Ohio ex. rel. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 275 (per curium)
(1960). Justice Brennan from the judgment of an equally divided court states
that the process of absorption "is not a license to the judiciary to administer a
watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of
Rights when state cases come before us." Id.
48. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (stating that before
a suspect is questioned, he "must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
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Amendment exclusionary rule and there will be others. In the
post Mapp49 cases, the Leon50 case in particular, in the post
Miranda cases, New York v. Quarles,5 1 for instance, Elstad,52
and many others.
The Supreme Court made clear that the rules that they require,
the Miranda rule and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule,
were not purely constitutional requirements. They were, as
Justice Harlan used the phrase earlier, not to refer to Miranda
and Mapp. He used it in another context; quasi-constitutional
rules. They are prophylactic rules. They are rules designed to
protect fundamental rights. Miranda is supposed to protect the
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause. As Justice
O'Connor said in Elstad, it is supposed to protect it but it sweeps
more broadly than the Fifth Amendment provision.5 3 You know
what that means: that means it is not really the same as the Fifth
Amendment.
How does this tie in with my earlier argument about
redundancy? Here is the link and here is the provocative part: If
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. ").
49. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that the
exclusionary rule is "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments .. ").
50. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 682 (1984) (concluding that
evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant obtained by a police officer in
good faith and reasonable reliance should not be excluded from trial even
though the magistrate's determination of probable cause was unsupported).
51. 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
52. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (holding that "a suspect
who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby
disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the
requisite Miranda warnings.").
53 . Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306. Justice O'Connor states: "The Miranda
exclusionary rule, however, serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more
broadly then the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be triggered even in the
absence of a Fifth Amendment violation. Id. She further explains in a footnote
that the "Miranda Court itself recognized this point when it disclaimed any
intent to create a 'constitutional straittjacket' and invited Congress and the
States to suggest 'potential alternatives for protecting the privilege."' Id.
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
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the state courts are able to protect rights, as I believe they have
proven that they are, then I contend that it is time to start
questioning some of the planks of the federal floor. It is time to
start taking another look at the incorporation process, at the
incorporated federal criminal procedure rules.
Which ones should we look at? I submit to you that we should
start re-examining those rules that are only quasi-constitutional
rules, where the constitutional foundation for the rule is shaky at
best, questionable, dubious.
How do we examine those rules? What do I mean by examine?
I believe that there is a standard that could be developed that will
be both cognizant of fundamental rights, sensitive to fundamental
rights, but also sensitive to the Tenth Amendment, sensitive to
the authority of the state courts to determine for themselves
procedural rules that do not involve fundamental rights.
The standard I suggest is the standard of essentiality. I would
contend that the Supreme Court should have to demonstrate from
this point on (I hope they are listening) that a right which is
deemed to be a part of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process be
proven to be essential to the administration of a fundamental
right. I did not pull this out of thin air, mind you. Louis B.
Henkin (no less authority than Louis B. Henkin) argued during
the bag and baggage controversy that this should have been a
requirement.54
How can you simply say in one breath that only fundamental
rights of the Bill of Rights applied to the states and in the next
breath say but all the bag and baggage, all of the loss, no matter
how fundamental or unfundamental it may be, also should apply
to the states? I don't think you can reconcile those positions and
neither did Lou Henkin.
Now, I am arguing that given the changed empirical
circumstances, given the proven rights sensitivity of the state
courts, proven by state constitutionalism, proven by the
redundancy between state constitutional law and federal
54. See Louis B. Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional
Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022 (1978) (describing how judicial interest
balancing is essential to constitutional construction).
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constitutional law, the Supreme Court should have to justify
imposing procedures upon the states and it should be forced,
compelled, and urged to reconsider those rules which they have
assumed apply to the states, which they have assumed apply to
due process. They should have to demonstrate that all procedural
rules that are a part of due process are essential to the
maintenance of a fundamental right.
And this is my proposal: That starting with the quasi-
constitutional rules -- Mapp, Miranda -- to give you other
examples, the Wade Right to Counsel, 55 to give you another
example, the Chapman Harmless Error Rule. 5 6 All of those rules
that the Court has said are just prophylactic rules, quasi-
constitutional rules, should be open to challenge, and litigants
should ask the Supreme Court to justify imposing them upon the
states.
If the Supreme Court feels that they cannot justify imposing a
rule upon the states because it is not essential to the maintenance
of a fundamental right, then that rule should be disincorporated.
That is, it should be excised from Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process and the states should be free to develop the law in that
area as they see fit. This is only proper because, remember, the
theory of incorporation was that only fundamental rights were a
part of due process.
So, I think I will leave it just at this. I think I have given you
enough, as Professor Bonventre says: "Red meat to attack."
Thank you very much.
Vincent Bonventre:
55. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (stating "that in
addition to counsel's presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need
not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or
informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate from the
accused's right to a fair trial.").
56. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding "that before
a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to
declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.").
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If your proposed disincorporation comes to pass I presume you
will be willing to move to Mississippi. We will raise that later
on.
Next we have Professor Peter Galie, 57 who really is the father
of us all when it comes to writing about the court of appeals'
protection of state constitutional rights and liberties. He did this
at a time when nobody was writing about the court of appeals and
virtually nobody understood that states actually could protect
rights and liberties. And you wrote about it and then seemed for a
long time thereafter still nobody was writing about it. So, you
kind of reminded them in a few other articles. Now all of a
sudden there is a bunch of us writing about it.
Peter Galie, we thank you and welcome you here. He is going
to talk to us about the New York Court of Appeals' adoption,
creation, conjuring up the exclusionary rule.
Peter Galie:
Conjured is the word. You can see from the remarks that going
last like this, the last panel, the last speaker, the end of the day,
is something like getting up in my house. I grew up in a house
full of brothers, lots of them, and the rule was the last up was the
worst dressed. But the speakers in the session have been
remarkably succinct. I hope I follow in their tradition.
This manuscript is an unedited fax. I had to make the deadline.
I scribbled notes to my secretary. None of this is her fault; it is
entirely my responsibility. I thought better to have my scribbled
notes in there than not to have it in there at all.
This manuscript intends to do two things. First, it is going to
be a history of search and seizure law in New York, state based
and statutory based, along with the exclusionary rule; and
second, it is a look at the contemporary status of the exclusionary
rule in New York. In fact, as Vin says, conjuring up. I thought
of titling this searching the record and excluding evidence (the
curious case of the exclusionary rule) "the silence of the judges,"
57. Peter Galie is a Professor of Political Science at Canisisus College in
Buffalo, New York.
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but did not want too many of the associations to be conjured up
by that title, so I stuck with the one I have.
I am going to just read parts of this and go quickly to the end
of it so you can get the gist of my position. What is fascinating
about the history to me was that prior to 1938, constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure was non-
existent in New York State. 58 A statute entitled a Bill of Rights
adopted in 1787 did not contain any such provision and neither
did the constitution of 1777 nor the constitution of 1821, at which
we adopted our first formal Bill of Rights, although a look at the
record makes it clear that the language of some if not most of the
clauses were directly taken from the Federal Constitution. 59
For the first time in New York's history, in 1828, in a revision
and amplification of the statute, the legislature added protection
against unreasonable search and seizure. It was essentially the
Fourth Amendment with two differences. The Fourth
Amendment reads in part: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not to be violated . . "60 The state
statute used "ought" rather than "shall." Similarly, here the
federal provision reads, "and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause . . . ." The state provision uses "can."
58. N.Y. CONST. amend. IV § 12, which was enacted in 1938, states in
pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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I need to amplify that. That is a very interesting question as to
why the language differed when they adopted that statute. I am
not sure I will be able to find out, but I do have some hints from
Lutz' wonderful book here. 6 1 He infers that the statute may have
reflected an older Whig tradition which rights were expressed in
the precatory "ought" rather than the imperative "shall" or
"must." Lutz suggests that the difference was significant in that
in precatory form these provisions did not effectively prohibit or
limit legislative action. The work here is Popular Consent.62
According to Lutz', the shift from "ought" to "shall" was
complete by the beginning of the Nineteenth Century, but yet
here we have the State legislature of New York adopting a statute
which persists in the use of this "ought" as late as 1828. It is all
curious and needs to be investigated.
In 1867, we had a convention which recommended a
constitution which included a search and seizure provision as a
constitutional provision, but that constitution was rejected. The
statute occasioned little litigation, and when it was litigated, the
court refused to undertake what the court designated as collateral
proceedings, that is, proceedings to determine whether the search
and seizure had been unreasonable or not on the grounds that the
common law was clear: The character of the search did not affect
the use of the fruits thus obtained. 63 That position was given its
most authoritative status in Adams, 64 which was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
The next step is the 1914 Weeks' decision. 65 You all know that
case, except remember it did not affect the state courts since the
Fourth Amendment had not yet been made applicable to the states
61. DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL
(Louisiana State University Press 1980).
62. Id.
63. See, e.g., Legatt v. Tollervey, 104 Eng. Rep. 617 (1811); Jordan v.
Lewis, 104 Eng. Rep. 168 (1811).
64. Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 595 (1904) (holding that
although evidence was seized illegally, it is admissible if it is pertinent to the
issues in the case).
65. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that papers
obtained from an illegal search must be timely returned to the accused to avoid
violating constitutional rights).
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through the Fourteenth Amendment. Nonetheless, the argument,
forcefully made by the Supreme Court, that without an
exclusionary rule the Fourth Amendment "is of no value, and, so
far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken
from the Constitution."' 66 That argument was unlikely to go
unnoticed by the state courts.
In 1926, the court of appeals did address this question in the
first major case after Weeks, which is People v. Defore.67 There,
in the famous decision by Benjamin Cardozo, the rule is rejected.
The court did not address the 1923 change in the amendment. I
came across this. I still do not know what to make of it but I
throw it out here. I have yet to finish the argument. To which
some believe was a response to the Adams' decision and the
"some" here I specifically refer to a delegate at the '38
convention, Frank Johnson. The argument was, Johnson made it
in part, that the movement from the admonitory "ought" to the
imperative "shall," that is what the amendment did, it went and
took the "ought" out and put the "shall" in, making it now more
identical with the Fourth Amendment.
He argues that negates the effects of the Adams' decision
authorizing the court to fashion a judicial remedy for effectuating
the right. The amendment, so worded now, coincided with its
national counterpart, which the Supreme Court had construed to
require exclusionary rule. This argument has some force, in my
opinion, not very much, the obvious response is that if the
legislature wished to require an exclusionary rule, it would have
determined whether, and under what circumstances, evidence
obtained by trespassing should be rejected.
On an issue of such grave importance, it is not unreasonable to
expect more explicit guidance than a change of the word "ought"
to "shall." And I did look. There is no bill, memoranda, no
correspondence. There is no legislative history. I only hope that
maybe something argued in the brief before Defore argued that
66. Id. at 393.
67. 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926). In Defore, the court held that an
unlawful search and seizure would not permit otherwise relevant and pertinent
evidence from being admissible in court. Id. at 18, 150 N.E. at 586.
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change was significant. I did not get the briefs but I will to see if
that is the case.
The court never addressed this argument, in any case. Was the
court even aware of the change? Had counsel failed to note and
argue the point? Did Cardozo believe the change nothing more
than an effort of uniformity or housekeeping?
The next major change comes at the Constitutional Convention
of 1938. Basically what we do after the very high level of
argument, at least a hundred pages of magnificent debate over
this question of the exclusionary rule, and after that lengthy
debate the convention decides to reject the inclusion of the
exclusionary rule but adopts a Fourth Amendment provision into
our Constitution. That is what happens in '38.
The first case after the constitutionalization of that protection
comes in, People v. Richter's Jeweler's,68 and the judge there,
the brother of Herbert Lehman, who supported this exclusionary
rule at the convention, writing for a unanimous court, held that
the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures did not
include a rule excluding any evidence obtained by such
searches. 69 And he makes explicit reference to the Constitutional
Convention's decision not to adopt. In the absence of any
guidance to the legislature, it would certainly be inconsistent with
the institutional regime for a court to explicitly override the
decision of a constituent assembly. And they did. I think that is
it. Very clear.
Well, after that I go into some of the changes in the law:
Wolf,70 Mapp71 and the like, applying the exclusionary rule to
the states. Skip over that. But Mapp raised a whole series of
issues: What role should the state amendment play?7 2 The
Supreme Court decisions said nothing about how the state
provision was to be interpreted. Here I list three options. The
state could interpret the state clause to mean what the federal
provision meant or to interpret the amendment to provide less
68. 291 N.Y. 161, 51 N.E.2d 690 (1943).
69. Id. at 169-70, 51 N.E.2d at 694.
70. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
71. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
72. Id. at 657.
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protection than its federal counterpart. That may seem
paradoxical. And, finally, could interpret the amendment to
provide more protection.
Between '49 and '70 the court adopted option one. Beginning
in the early '80's the court adopted option three, that's providing
more protection. The decision to embark on an independent
course and develop a separate body of state constitutional law
raised lots of problems for us, I think. And I mention some of
these, they are in the headlines today: Pataki's proposals, the
attack on the Wall Street Journal and the New York Daily News
and the like.7 3
Here is the theoretical problem, not the political one: If the
court was to rely on state grounds what are the criteria for doing
so? Can a reasonable or principled basis for such resort be
articulated? That is what much of the literature on state
constitutional law is about, arguing over that. That is one aspect
of the problem.
My argument was to focus on something differently: that was
the question of how should the state court deal with the problem
of the exclusionary rule when it has rejected or at least it has
decided not to interpret the National Constitution, but interpret its
own, provide better protection or greater protection at the state
level.
Where does that leave it with regard to the exclusionary rule?
Here's what I say about that: focus here is on the status of the
remedy for such violations. Mapp v. Ohio did not overrule
Richter's. The case involved a question of whether the state
constitutional provisions required the application of an
73. See Peter Reinharz, Rule of Law: The Court New York Criminals Love,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1996. The author states:
The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled to strike a balance between
criminal suspects' Fourth Amendment rights and the legitimate
needs of law enforcement authorities. But the ultimate arbiter of
criminal procedure in state court -- where most criminal trials take
place -- is the state's high court, which is free to extend additional
rights to defendants, based on the state constitution.
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exclusionary rule. That point was made explicitly by Judge
Desmond in Sackler v. Sackler.74
Now, as long as the court's decisions were based on federal
grounds, we don't have a problem, but put bluntly the issue is as
follows: If the court decision rests on the state provisions and not
the Fourth Amendment, what is the basis for the exclusion of the
evidence? It cannot be the federally imposed exclusionary rule as
that rule is an adjunct of the Fourth Amendment. It must in some
way rest on state law.
Here I refer to Cassell, and you might think there is a mistake
here found later in, but it is really found in Latzer. There is a
"see" left out. I apologize for that.
Back to the point here: The state law question would seem to
have been clearly settled by the 1938 convention which after high
and thorough debate rejects the proposal to adopt an exclusionary
rule, a decision reaffirmed by the court of appeals after the
convention.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals did, in fact, exclude evidence
in all the cases in which it based its decision on state grounds. 75
It continued to speak of the exclusionary rule and its importance,
but which exclusionary rule, state or federal? In the cases where
the exclusionary rule was defended, federal precedents were
cited, but no mention of a state based exclusionary rule was
found.
What was the status of the rule in New York? Was it a
constitutionally mandated extension of the Fourth Amendment or
was it like the federal rule, a judicially-fashioned remedy?
Somewhere in the constitutional shift from federal to state based
protections a crucial step was omitted, or, assumed sub silentio
by the court. If there is a state based judicially-fashioned
exclusionary rule, are there any exceptions to that rule or, unlike
its federal counterpart, is it a hard and fast rule, a bright line?
74. 15 N.Y.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 481, 255 N.Y.S.2d 83 (1964).
75. See People v. Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 483 N.Y.S.2d
181 (1984); People v. Gokey, 60 N.Y.2d 309, 457 N.E.2d 723, 469
N.Y.S.2d 618 (1983); People v. Elwell, 50 N.Y.2d 231, 406 N.E.2d 471.
428 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1980).
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When the court has addressed the role of the exclusionary rule,
it has done so solely in a federal context. I list cases where the
court has cited in every case applying federal precedence they say
it's a state -- it is a judicially-fashioned remedy by citing federal
law. It is not until People v. Johnson,76 this is where things came
to a head, that the court under the prodding of a stinging
concurrence even acknowledged the problem. 7 7
In Johnson, the court expressly relied on Article 1, Section
1278 to decide an issue not settled by the Supreme Court's
decision in Gates79 and excluded the evidence. 80 In concurrence,
Judge Vito Titone wrote:
I agree with the majority that there should be a
reversal, but cannot join its opinion which
establishes an exclusionary rule under our State
Constitution, thus amending the Constitution in a
fashion explicitly rejected by the delegates to the
1938 Constitutional Convention, and overruling
three decisions sub silentio [Richter's, Defore and
Adams]. 8 1
Titone notes that the issue of whether the exclusionary rule is
supported by the state constitution was not raised by the parties in
this case, nor, in fact, any of the cases in which the court has
refused to follow the interpretation given to the Fourth
Amendment by the Supreme Court. 82 He concluded that although
it is impossible to anchor the exclusionary rule in the state
constitution, his way of dealing with it, at least he faced it, was
to say it's a "judge-made common-law rule of evidence." 83 How
76. 66 N.Y.2d 398, 488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1985).
77. Id. at 408, 488 N.E.2d at 446, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (Titone, J.,
concurring).
78. Id. at 406, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
79. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
80. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 406, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
81. Id. at 408, 488 N.E.2d at 446, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (Titone, J.
concurring).
82. Id. at 412, 488 N.E.2d at 449, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 628 (Titone, J.
concurring).
83. Id. at 413, 488 N.E.2d at 450, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 629 (Titone, J.
concurring).
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could he do otherwise in the face of what the '38 Constitutional
Convention did?
It is not clear, however, that the majority did, in fact, ground
the rule in the constitution. Judge Simons makes no explicit
statement to that effect. Indeed, the only response to Titone's
challenge came in the following footnote in Johnson: "Insofar as
the concurring judges contend that exclusion is a common-law
rule rather than a constitutional doctrine under New York law,
we would but add that, notwithstanding the history they recite,
the court has excluded evidence on State constitutional grounds in
the past . "84
Now they cite these three cases. Of course, like dutiful scholars
we go back and read those cases. I read them carefully again and
again. The footnote can be read to claim constitutional status for
the rule or that the majority had acquiesced in Titone's
understanding of its status as judicially fashioned. 85 I cannot tell
and I would like some help here. An examination of the cases
cited by the majority, however, does not lend support for the
argument that the court has excluded evidence on the basis of a
state exclusionary rule. Those cases make no such statement
about an adoption, constitutional or common law, in character.
In no case has the court of appeals made an explicit decision to
adopt a state based exclusionary rule to determine the status of
the rule, or to articulate its relationship to the federally based
rule. Titone's challenge was left essentially unanswered. It
appears that the court is willing to continue acting on the unstated
assumption that there is a state based exclusionary rule, whether
it is constitutionally-mandated or a judicially-fashioned rule of
evidence, and that its contours and exceptions, if any, will be
determined the way all common law courts work things out: on a
case by case basis.
Left unanswered is the question of how or why the court could
adopt such a rule in the face of a constitutional convention's
decision to the contrary, and the consistent decisions of the court
84. Id. at 398, 488 N.E.2d at 446, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (citations
omitted).
85. Id.
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of appeals for almost two hundred years. Moreover, if the rule is
a judge-based rule of evidence, then it is fair game for legislative
action of the kind advocated by Governor Pataki.
The court of appeals' treatment or non-treatment of this issue
raises troubling questions about the New Federalism and lends
support to the view expressed by one of the early critics of state
based rights protection triggered by changes in Supreme Court
doctrine: It is a constitutional "shell game." In facing the
challenge raised by Governor Pataki's proposals to curb the
court' activism, the court may have unwittingly provided the
Governor with the needed ammunition. Thank you.
Vincent Bonventre:
Professor Galie, are you intimating that the court of appeals has
fudged up on this issue? I am wondering if we should send a
copy of the videotape to the judges of the court of appeals.
It reminds me of something Rehnquist said when I was in
Washington for the year. I was asking him about some of the
court of appeals' recent decisions, and Rehnquist said to me, "the
New York Court of Appeals is free to do what it wants for New
York, but it ought to have some basis for what it's doing".
Now comes the time we are going to open up the floor for
questions, comments, diatribes, anything you want to say or ask,
preferably about something that was said here at this session or
earlier in the day. I open it up.
Helen Hershkoff:
This is directed to Professor Latzer. There is literature of
course, on redundancy, which is the flip-side of parity in many
respects. There are at least some scholars who try to ground
arguments in favor of redundancy, not on empirical grounds, but
on structural grounds.
I am thinking, for example, about the discussion of habeas and
the redundant uses of jurisdiction between state and federal
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courts. They see jurisdictional redundancy 86 like constitutional
redundancy, as a structural check on government. Just as a court
is the check on the legislature, so the state is a check on the
federal government, and the federal government is a check on the
state government. The argument proceeds to whether or not each
particular form is favorable or respectful of rights. The argument
proceeds, almost despite the empirical evidence, since it is
intended as a prophylactic, a bulwark or a preventive.
Your argument places a great deal of weight, in fact, on
empirical evidence. The fact that states now have evolved over
the last thirty years, comes back to the historic role and we have
about a hundred years that were pretty bad. But now, we can go
back to trusting the states. And I wonder where the structural
86. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy:
Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REv. 639 (1981).
Jurisdictional redundancy is a structural solution that Will frequently give
relief. Id. at 661. It is the suspicion of corruption, so often unproveable, that
leads a litigant to invoke a parallel forum. Id. Even if one of the litigants
expects to benefit from corruption and opts for the corrupt forum, the potential
of a system of concurrency for synchronic redundancy inhibits the operation of
corruption. Id. The development of data to prove or reinforce the suspicion of
corrupt complicity will be greatly aided by an independent forum, even if its
outcome must compete with those of the corrupt forum for ultimate
implementation. Id. If a party to litigation is "about to get railroaded by a
corrupt system, [he will] greatly value the opportunity to invoke a fair forum
even if the corrupt forum's verdict does not bear its corruption on its sleeve
and, thus, will compete with that [forum]." Id. at 661-62. See also Susan N.
Herman, Reconstructing the Bill of Rights: A Reply to Antar and Marcus's
Triple Play On Double Jeopardy, 95 COLUM. L. REV 1090, 1111, n. 29
(1995). Congress has endorsed relitigation as a suitable form of jurisdictional
redundancy in habeas corpus statutes where federal civil rights violations by
state actors are alleged. Id. In a situation where an individual feels that he is in
state custody in violation of the United States Constitution, he must bring his
claim to a state court. Id. "As a result, state and federal courts achieve [a]
relationship.. .[whereby]. . .[t]he state courts have the first chance to remedy
the constitutional missteps of their employees, while the federal courts hover
in the background to provide an incentive for the state courts to render
reasonable decisions, or, if necessary, to overrule unreasonable decisions." Id.
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arguments87 fit in to your approach since no mention was made
of them.
Barry Latzer:
I am not sure what you mean by "structural arguments." Are
you referring to the role of the federal courts as checks upon the
state court?
Helen Hershkoff'
And vice versa. And that each one provides an important outlet
for the other. That there is some kind of reciprocal relation. That
part of the reason, for example, we expect state courts to now be
protective of rights (is that) there has been policing by the federal
courts. Likewise, the reason that federal courts might be
hospitable or not hospitable to rights would depend on a
relationship they have with state courts. It is hard to imagine how
any particular actor would behave in the absence of other agents
in the governmental structure.
Barry Latzer:
I think I understand. My response to that is, I favor
maintaining that relationship. I do not favor eliminating the
relationship because I do not favor eliminating the federal floor. I
simply favor questioning some of the planks in the federal floor.
I simply favor reviewing whether every single Supreme Court
decision, that is somehow tied to the Bill of Rights, should also
be automatically put into Fourteenth Amendment due process. I
am simply asking that they reopen the question.
87 See, e.g., Deconstruction, Structuralism, Antisemitism and the Law,
36 B.C. L. REV. 1, 9 (1994). Structuralism is "literary criticism [that] aims to
reveal the fundamental principles which govern literariness, systematizing the
components of literary discourse in novel categories. Systematization is the
fundamental and revolutionary attribute which structuralism introduced into
French literary criticism." Id. Structuralism is founded upon the belief in
universal laws and structures. Id.
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So my answer to you is this: I would maintain the federal floor.
I would maintain the check on the state courts, but I would only
maintain it with respect to either a fundamental right or some
procedure that it is demonstrated to be essential to the
maintenance of a fundamental right.
And so I am not just making an empirical argument; I am
making a constitutional law argument. The constitutional law
argument is this: if the Court cannot demonstrate that a procedure
is either itself a fundamental right or essential to the maintenance
of a fundamental right, then I do not think there is any
constitutional warrant for imposing it upon the states for due
process.
If you accept that proposition and you accept the argument that
the states have now proven themselves to be sensitive to
defendants' rights, then I think it does follow that the Court
ought to reconsider some of its incorporation decisions.
So my short answer to you then, is: I would not eliminate the
federal floor. I think the federal floor has been salutary and I
think it is still advisable to maintain it with respect to either
fundamental rights or those procedural requirements that are so
directly supportive of fundamental rights that we can say they are
essential to fundamental rights.
Helen Hershkoffi.
Your argument is really a substantive quarrel with the Court's
Fourth, 88 Fifth89 and Sixth Amendment90 jurisprudence. It is not
88. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in
pertinent part:
"[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons... against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized." Id.
89. U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part:
"[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury. .. nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
19961
TO URO LAW REVIEW
really an argument about state courts because the empirical
discussion about state courts is interesting, but it does not really
further the argument. What you have is a quarrel with Federal
Constitutional doctrine. You do not like these cases whether or
not they are applied to the states, you do not want them applied
to federal court proceedings either.
Barry Latzer:
No. I do not think so. If a Supreme Court decision is based
directly on the Fourth Amendment, such as where the Court
defines what is a reasonable or unreasonable search, I do not
believe that should be eligible for disincorporation.
Helen Hershkoff:
I do not mean to interrupt. I am focusing on the examples that
you used. I am not taking them at your word. I am looking at
Miranda. 9 1
Barry Latzer:
Yes, but I am not picking them because I dislike them; I am
picking them because the Court said that they are not based
jeopardy ... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law . . . . " Id.
90. U.S. CONST. amend VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part:
"[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial ... to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." Id.
91. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that "the
prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination."). Id.
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directly on interpretation of the Constitution. They are quasi-
constitutional, and that is why I am picking them. There are lots
of Fourth Amendment decisions that I do not like, but I would
not think they should be eligible for disincorporation because,
rightly or wrongly, the Supreme Court has the authority to tell us
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. That is all they are doing
when they are saying this search is reasonable and that one is not.
So, I am not just arbitrarily picking decisions that I dislike. I am
picking decisions the Court itself has undermined. It has
undermined the constitutional foundation by saying that it is not
required by the Constitution.
Helen Hershkoff.
Thank you.
Vincent Bonventre:
Would there be any substance, any essence, whatsoever, to the
federal government's Fourth Amendment check against the states
and the Fifth Amendment check against the states if there was no
exclusionary rule92 or Miranda? What would the check be?
This is a search. This is a seizure. We are not going to do
anything about it, but that is what it is.
92. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding that the
exclusionary rule is "an essential part of both the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.. . ."). See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963). Defendants were convicted of "fraudulent and knowing transportation
and concealment of illegally imported heroin." Id. at 473. The Court noted
that "an arrest with or without a warrant must stand on firmer ground than
suspicion .... though the arresting officer need not have in hand evidence
which would suffice to convict." Id. at 479. The Court held that the search
was unlawful and stated "[i]n order to make effective the fundamental
constitutional guarantees of sanctity of the home and inviolability of the
person... evidence seized during an unlawful search could not constitute
proof against the victim of the search." Id. at 485. Furthermore. "verbal
evidence which derives so immediately from an unauthorized arrest as the
officers' action in the present case is no less the 'fruit' of official illegality than
the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion." Id.
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Barry Latzer:
Well, the Supreme Court will still be interpreting the Fourth
Amendment. Cases could still be appealed to the Supreme Court
asking about the meaning of that Amendment and requiring them
to rule on the meaning of it. The Court would interpret the
Fourth Amendment just the way it always had. It simply would
not be able to order the suppression of evidence.
Vincent Bonventre:
Say this is a search and it was illegally conducted, period.
What good is that? What is the check?
Barry Latzer:
It is pretty much the same check you have today. The fact that
they exclude the evidence in and of itself really is not what makes
the impact. What makes the impact is that most state courts and
most lower federal courts want to comply with Supreme Court
rulings. It is essentially their commitment to the system. They
know damn well that the Supreme Court is not capable of
reviewing the thousands and thousands of Fourth Amendment
cases. We have essentially a voluntary compliance which would
remain in place. The only thing that the Court would not be able
to do is it would not be able to order the exclusion of the
evidence on its own. I do not see that as a major problem.
I might add, by the way, that this coincides with Professor
Galie's work. 93 I studied state constitutional exclusionary rules
and virtually every state has announced that they have their own
constitutional exclusionary rule. 94 So, lest you fear there could
be no exclusion of evidence, you are mistaken, because many
93. See PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY, A CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF NEW YORK (1996) (providing the historical background to the
adoption of the New York State search and seizure provision).
94. See Barry Latzer, Toward the Decentralization of Criminal Procedure:
State Constitutional Law and Selective Disincorporation 87 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 101 (1996) (stating that at least 74% of the states have a
suppression policy grounded upon state law)
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states would continue to exclude evidence on State Constitutional
grounds even though they may not have always done so.
Peter Galie:
Barry, you have got the wrong word. They have not
"announced." They have "decided."
Barry Latzer:
That only shows their right sensitivity, because here we have a
constitutional history, as you have excellently demonstrated. Here
in New York, we have a constitutional history that runs against
an exclusionary rule, and here we have the New York Court of
Appeals that is so anxious to protect rights that it goes ahead and
excludes the evidence anyway until one judge calls them on it and
then they ignore him and continue to exclude evidence. 95 I think
that says quite a bit for their rights sensitivity.
My point is even if Mapp were disincorporated, there would be
a heck of a lot of exclusion anyway. I only found one state, the
state of Maine, which sort of very quietly announced "we have
no State Constitutional exclusionary rule." 96 That is the only
95. People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398,488 N.E.2d 439, 497 N.Y.S.2d
618 (1985) (despite historic opposition to suppression, the New York Court of
Appeals has excluded evidence on state constitutional grounds a number of
times). But see The concurring opinion, where Judge Titone recited the history
of opposition to a state constitutional exclusionary rule and urged that
exclusion be grounded upon state common law. Id. at 409-15, 488 N.E.2d at
446-51, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 625-30 (concurring opinion).
96. See, e.g., State v. Tarantino, 587 A.2d 1095 (Me. 1991) (holding
that, although the credibility of informants was not established, "the aggregate
of those tips and the corroborating information of the officers who encountered
Tarantino on Vinalhaven Island were enough to create probable cause to justify
the search of Tarantino's vehicle."); State v. Giles, 669 A.2d 192, 194 (Me.
1996). Defendant argued, "that the random stopping of boats... absent any
articulable suspicion of wrongdoing and absent any restraint on the officers'
discretion, constitutes a violation of his right... to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures." Id. at 192. The court held the searches to be
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state I found that actually said that. Of course California has none
but that was not by case authority, that was because of
Proposition 8. 97
Vincent Bonventre:
You seem to be arguing that we do not seem to double check.
You really do not seem to be arguing with disincorporation. We
would be maintaining one.
Barry Latzer:
I am arguing that the need for the double check is not as great
as it once was, and, that we do not need incorporation the way
we once did. The assumptions underlying the incorporation
doctrine were right, but the Supreme Court has really failed to
justify incorporating these quasi-constitutional rules. It should
have to justify incorporating those rules because if their
constitutional support is questionable or dubious, then it seems
that they are ripe candidates for a determination as to whether or
not they should be a part of due process. I am asking the Court to
make that determination.
Luke Biennan:
Is that not a problem, though? Are we not just saying that we
are going to fight, as we did fifty or seventy-five years ago, as to
whether something is a fundamental right98 or whether the
Constitutional and stated, "we have not adopted an exclusionary rule for illegal
search and seizure beyond that mandated by Mapp v. Ohio." Id. at 194.
97. See In re Lance, 694 P.2d 744 (1985) (Proposition 8, adopted in 1982,
amended the California Constitution so as to abolish the state constitutional
exclusionary rule.)
98. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). A New York statute
provided that no employee shall "work in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or
confectionery establishment more than sixty hours in any one week, or more
than ten hours in any one day." Id. at 46. The Court found that the statute at
issue interfered "with the right of contract between employer and employees,
concerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor in the bakery of
the employer." Id. at 53. The Court held that the right to enter into a contract
172 [Vol 13
CHANGING CONSTITUTION
procedural rights are supportive or essential. Are we not back
where we started; a seventy year tradition of fighting over these
things?
Barry Latzer:
My answer is no. I do not think anybody is going to turn back
the clock to the day we say that the Self-Incrimination Clause99 is
not a part of due process, or the Double Jeopardy Clause100 is
not a part of due process, or the Fourth Amendment is not a part
of due process. No one favors that. I do not think any credible
related to employment or business "is part of the liberty of the individual
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution," Id. The
Court subsequently ruled the statute unconstitutional. Id. at 64-65.; Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (articulating a test for determining whether
the Bill of Rights applied to the states). Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter, both
strong proponents of selective incorporation, developed this test as whether the
guarantee is of "the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty" and further,
whether it is a "fundamental [principle] of liberty and justice which [lies) at
the base of all our civil and political institutions." Id. at 328. The ban on
double jeopardy was found to be insufficiently fundamental, and thus was
found not to be applicable to the states. Id.; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46 (1947). Adamson, a United States citizen, "was convicted without
recommendation for mercy, by a jury in a Superior Court of the State of
California of murder in the first degree." Id. at 47-48. The challenged
California law permitted "the failure of a defendant to explain or to deny
evidence against him to be commented upon by court and by counsel and to be
considered by court and jury." Id. at 48. The Court assumed that such
comment "would infringe defendant's privilege against self-incrimination [if]
this were a trial in a court of the United States." Id. at 50. The Court held that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the privilege. Id. at 51.:
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). In Duncan the test adopted in
PaLko was modified as to, whether the guarantee is "[fundamental to the
American scheme of justice," Id. at 149. The Court found that the right to a
jury trial in state criminal prosecutions was guaranteed, and did apply to the
states by the 14th Amendment. Id.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. V., which states in pertinent part: "[nio person
shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.. . ." Id.
100. U.S. CONST. amend V., which states in pertinent part: [... nior
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb. ... " Id.
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argument can be made for it. I do not think we can go back that
far.
What I do think we could question is the Miranda rule. We
could question the Wade10 1 rule, which said you had the right to
counsel if you were in, a line-up and if there was not compliance
with that, they exclude the identification, which is an extremely
harsh rule and very difficult to support on constitutional grounds.
I would question the need for the Chapman102 rule. I would
question, in other words, the quasi-constitutional, subsidiary, and
prophylactic rules which have dubious constitutional warrant.
Those would be subject to challenge and those perhaps should be
disincorporated, but I do not think it would undermine the most
basic fundamental rights. I am not calling for a challenge to a
fundamental right, I am calling for a challenge to a non-
fundamental right; a right that is not essential to a fundamental
right.
Luke Bierman:
But, of course, that is what they fought over for seventy-five
years: defining what is a fundamental right. 103
Barry Latzer:
101. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). In Wade, the Court was
presented with the issue of "whether courtroom identifications of an accused at
trial are to be excluded from evidence because the accused was exhibited to
witnesses before trial at a ... lineup ... without notice to and in the absence
of the accused's appointed counsel" in violation of his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and Sixth Amendment right to the
assistance of counsel. Id. at 219-20. The Court held that "the accused is
guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the
prosecution ... where counsel's absence might derogate from the accused's
right to a fair trial." Id. at 226.
102. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) Defendants were
convicted of first-degree robbery and simple kidnapping. Id at 18. The
Supreme Court held that, "[blefore a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless the reviewing court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 1d.
103. See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J.
253 (1982).
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Do you think there is any lobby? Do you think there is any
significant support for eliminating the basic principles of the Bill
of Rights from due process?
Luke Bierman:
Does that not bring us back to the original premises? We use
New York a lot, but what about other states? I mean are the
states as supportive as we think they are?
Barry Latzer:
Good question. In the longer version of this argument I have a
chart in which I try to show that the level of redundancy is not
only deep, but it is broad. I try to show that states all over the
country, including the southern states, which are always targeted
for being the most conservative, have to a much greater extent
than is acknowledged, either adopted Federal Constitutional
procedures on state grounds or broadened them.
If you wish, I will show you cases from West Virginia, 10 4
from Texas 105 and even from Mississippi, 10 6 that have done so.
While these are conservative states, and while they have not
broadened rights perhaps the way, say, Massachusetts and Hawaii
have, nonetheless, they have adopted many rights on state
constitutional grounds. 107
James Gardner:
104. See, e.g., State v. Goff, 272 S.E.2d 457 (W.Va. 1980) (enlarging
vehicle impoundment and inventory rights on state constitutional grounds).
105. See, e.g., Autran v. State, 887 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. Crim. 1994)
(expanding state constitutional rights respecting inventory search).
106. See, e.g., Threlkeld v. State, 586 So. 2d 756 (Miss. 1991) (adopting
an "innocent owner" exception in forfeiture actions based on the state
constitution).
107. Massachusetts and Hawaii are among the most liberal state courts
when it comes to expanding rights on state constitutional grounds. See BARRY
LATZER, STATE CONSTrTUTIONAL CRiMiNAL LAW (1995) (collecting cases
from all 50 states and analyzing those that reject federal constitutional
doctrines in order to establish broader rights).
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I just wanted to jump in and make a slightly different point or
make the same point as Professor Bierman is making, but in a
slightly different way. I fear that the task that you are setting is
an impossible one. In fact, the approach here, I find to be a sort
of interesting mix of formalism, either that or radical legal
realism. It is formalistic in this way: we draw a distinction
between fundamental rights and then other stuff that is tacked
onto it, which is formalistic almost in a platonic way. Come on
out of the cave and I will show you what the Fourth Amendment
really is.
I think that is not possible; that the content of a right is not
distinct from the ways in which it is enforced, so that part seems
to me to be impossible to achieve. What you are suggesting goes
to the other extreme of radical legal realism, where you are
saying, "Hey, Supreme Court, we do not need this, so take it out
of the Constitution," as though the Court is completely free to
put in what belongs there and take out what does not belong
there. That seems to me to ignore the dynamic of judicial
decision-making, which is supposed to be principled. That is
what everybody here is complaining about, it is too unprincipled.
Audience Member:
If you were to remove the exclusionary rule as being a matter
of procedure and being non-essential, what sanction do you have
left for enforcing the Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable searches?
Barry Latzer:
Well, that, of course, is an excellent question, and although I
think it can be argued that it is not essential, I think that is the
kind of analysis that has to be engaged in. All I ask is that the
Court engage in it and that the Court at least demonstrate that a
rule which it has conceded is not a constitutional mandate is
nonetheless essential to the maintenance of a fundamental right.
And, by the way, this is an answer to Professor Gardner as
well: it is not I who said that these procedures are not solidly
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grounded in the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court that said
that. The Supreme Court said that in Leon10 8 about the
exclusionary rule. I did not say it, they said it.
As for alternative mechanisms of enforcement, you are leaving
out the main mechanism that I want to rely upon, and that is the
exclusionary rule based on state constitutional law. I am willing
to trust the state courts to develop the appropriate mechanism of
enforcement. That is, it could be a state exclusionary rule. It
could be some alternative to it. It could be a modified
exclusionary rule. Professor Amar just wrote a whole long
article 109  on presenting what he argued, perhaps not
persuasively, are alternative methods for enforcing the Fourth
Amendment.
I say leave it to the state courts. If the state courts are sensitive
to defendants' rights, and I think they are, if they are competent
to handle search and seizure cases, and I think they are, then I
am willing to leave it up to them to decide the cases. If it is not a
fundamental right, it should not be jammed down the state courts'
throats. They should be free to determine for themselves the best
enforcement mechanism.
Maybe you are right; maybe exclusion is the best way to
enforce the Fourth Amendment. And to that I say two things:
one, the Court should demonstrate that it is so, and two, if they
108. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The Burbank, California,
Police Department initiated a drug trafficking investigation which employed
surveillance of the respondents' activities. The Court stated that "[t]he
deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police
have engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has
deprived the defendant of some right." Id. at 919. Furthermore, the purpose
behind refusing to admit evidence that was not properly obtained, is to
hopefully "instill in those particular investigating officers, or in their future
counterparts, a greater degree of care toward the rights of an accused." Id.
Suppressing evidence "remains an appropriate remedy if the magistrate or
judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the
affiant knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless
disregard of the truth." Id. at 923.
109. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757 (1994).
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cannot, they should leave it up to the state courts to come up with
appropriate alternatives.
Peter Galie:
It should be remembered that the guy who started all this, John
Wilkes, had his papers ransacked, in fact, succeeded in getting a
hefty penalty for such ransack. 110 It is not crucial to either
argument. There is the tort remedy, in fact, which has operated
on occasions. But leave that aside a minute. As a dabbler in
Protestant theology, it seems that a parallel argument was made
by one of the most famous of them who wrote a book. 1 1 And
the point of that was, could we separate the core of Christianity
from the husk, the stuff that was accidental or historic, 112 to get
to the heart of what it is to be a Christian. He started the ball
rolling and before you know it, you seem to get less and less of
this belief and more and more seems to be myth.
I do have a comment on your paper, James. One of the points
you make, if you go back in the state court history of New York,
is a history of decentralized power in earlier times in terms of the
Governor's power. Two major corrections to that. One, when we
started, the Governor of New York was probably the strongest of
any of the states. 113 Two, since 1894, the entire direction of the
Constitution has been toward a strengthened, centralized,
protective party, so we can pick the 1970 period out, skip over
'77; and look at the period of decentralization. While not looking
at the 20th Century, we can look at the beginning and the later
developments. The direction, from the court point of view is, we
110. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 483 (1965) (citing Wilkes v.
Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 (1763)) (stating that Wilkes, the publisher of an
anonymous opposition newspaper was entitled to damages from the Secretary
of State for an unreasonable search and seizure designed to inhibit further
production of the newspaper).
111. HANS BARTSCH & RUDOLPH BULTMANN, KERYGMA AND MYTH: A
THEOLOGICAL DEBATE (1961).
112. Id.
113. PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
NEW YORK 42 (1996).
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are centralizing and giving the government more power in terms
of the argument.
James Gardner:
I am grateful to know that. The only point I am trying to make
is that in ten minutes of flipping through the history of the State
Constitution, it gives you an idea of things you ought to think
about and respond to and the court did not do that.
Peter Galie:
I do not think they did. You are right.
James Gardner:
Can I ask Professor Swidorski a question? This actually comes
back to Vin's questions about IQ. The only adjective that you did
not mention among all the adjectives was quality. Obviously you
are not purporting to measure the quality of the decisions. Would
you care to hazard a guess? I assume one tinkers with the
selection process not because one desires to get a certain justice
or certain profile in terms of age and region but because one
wants better judges.
Carl Swidorski:
Well, that is the argument of the judicial reform movement. I
did talk about quality in the sense that under the old system when
I studied from 1950 to 1975 and introduced about sixty to seventy
individuals in it; I invariably mentioned quality as a threshold or
byline consideration, and even times paid lip service to it. 114 A
general point they made: the argument of the judicial reform
movement was that somehow the quality was going to improve.
I have a theoretic problem with that and I have a problem if we
look at the justice appointments. If we look at the transition
114. Carl Swidorski, The Politics of Judicial Selection: Accession to the
New York State Court of Appeals, 1950-1975 (1977) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, State University of New York at Albany).
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period, the exact same individuals were selected in the first four
to five appointments to the Court under the merit system that
either had been selected or were leading candidates under the old
system. 115 I do not see any transition in quality. We have the
exact same human beings. Otherwise getting into measuring
issues of quality is somewhat problematic in that sense. The other
thing on quality in a theoretical sense, David O'Brien, one of the
leading scholars of the U.S. Supreme Court, talked about the
attempt to measure merit, judicial quality and temperament, and
the argument was all of the judges who talk about it have a
fundamental problem. 116 They cannot define it. And he said it is
sort of similar to what Stewart said about pornography, "I know
it when I see it." 117 So, it is a fundamentally difficult question to
sort of say "are these fourteen people smarter and in some ways
higher equals than the twenty-three who went before them."
If you wanted to look at one kind of measure, New York State
Bar Association ratings, or Association of the Bar of the City of
New York ratings, under the old system everyone was found
qualified.
Under the new system, almost everyone was found qualified to
the degree those people suggest they can assess quality. Not
making significant assessments.
Luke Biennan:
I do not think there is any doubt about any of that. Usually
when merit selection, merit appointment or so-called merit plans
are adopted, the idea is to sort of alter the prevailing dynamics of
judicial selection. Carter's merit selection programs when he was
President was to shift primary responsibility from the Senate to
115. Carl Swidorski, Judicial Selection Reform and the New York Court of
Appeals: Illusion or Reality, 55 N.Y. ST. B. J. 10 (1983).
116. DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 67 (1993).
117. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
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the Presidency, which is what the studies indicate. 118 Missouri
went from local, back room politics to the more state wide
politics so that the goal was sort of to upset things. 119
In New York, let me suggest that the motivation for adoption
of merit selection, merit appointment, was precisely the opposite.
To maintain the power, where you suggest it was, with the
Governor and the political party leaders, through a series of
highly contentious Court of Appeals elections in the "70's,
democracy ran amuck and we allowed it, and the candidate got
on the ballot without the parties' support. 120 Jacob Fuchsberg 12 1
got elected with not only no party support, through a petition
process, as the only person to be not qualified by the prevailing
bar associations.
Carl Swidorski:
118. See, e.g., ALAN NEFI THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
NOMINATING COMMISSIONS: THEIR MFMBERS, PROCEDURES AND
CANDIDATES 151 (1981) (stating that President Jimmy Carter's merit selection
process redistributed power, giving the President more power in selecting
judges); LARRY C. BERKSON & SUSAN B. CARBON, THE UNITED STATES
CIRCUIT JUDGE NOMINATING COMMISSION: IT'S MEMBERS, PROCEDURES AND
CANDIDATES 183 (1980) (concluding that although the nominating committee
was effective, it was partisan); Elliot E. Slotnick, Federal Appellate Judge
Selection: Recruitment Changes and Unanswered Questions, 6 JUST. SYS. J.
283, 291 (1981) (asserting that a less magnanimous motivation toward merit
selection was a transfer of power from senate to the presidency); Elliot E.
Slotnick, The U.S. Circuit Judge Nominating Commission, I L. & POL'Y Q.
465, 491 (1979) (stating that although politics is still a significant factor in
judicial merit selection of federal judges, it is now "played to a greater
extent... in the President's own ballpark.").
119. RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE
BENCH AND THE BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NO,\-
PARTISAN COURT PLAN (1969).
120. See CYNTHIA OWEN PHILIP ET AL., WHERE DO JUDGES COME FROM?
(1976).
121. In 1974, Jacob D. Fuchsberg was elected to New York's highest court,
the New York Court of Appeals and served on the bench as an associate judge
for eight years, from 1975 to 1983. Following his resignation in 1983,
Fuchsberg founded his own law practice in New York City. His expertise in
civil litigation pertained to negligence, products liability, medical malpractice,
railroad and commercial law.
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Under the old system there were four people found not
qualified, or three and a half depending on how you count Sol
Wachtler. 122 The best evidence is, he was found not qualified
initially and after a number of phone calls both from the
Governor's office and Joe Margiotta's office, he was found
qualified within the necessary forty-eight hours before the
convention.
The other people found not qualified were Jacob Fuchsberg and
two women, the only two women nominees at the time: Annette
Gemis and Constance Cook. So it is clear that in one sense, in
the case of Wachtler, their concern was; age was disqualifying,
and you could make an argument that they had serious
reservations, at least in the early '70's, whether women had
sufficient judicial temperament, IQ, background and experience,
to be qualified.
Luke Biennan:
But their attainment of the ballot and their successes against the
wishes of the traditional party leaders and Governors indicate that
perhaps the New York merit system, which does not use the
retention elections that are a traditional standard in merit
appointment or the merit selection process and instead using the
Commission on Judicial Nomination appointed by the Governor,
political party leaders, the Chief Judge, and the State Senate
confirmation, indicates that they attempted to keep power where
it was before rather than alter it.
So, it is, from my perspective, a shift on the traditional
approach in the political science literature that they adopt merit
selection to alter prevailing dynamics with judicial selection.
Here merit selection may well have been implemented to
maintain the traditional dynamics of the process.
122. Judge Sol Wachtler was elected to the bench in 1973 and was later
appointed Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals in 1986. He served
as Chief Judge from 1987 to 1992. Judge Wachtler resigned from the bench in
1992 and served 15 months in jail for attempting to extort money from his
former lover.
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Peter Galie:
I am trying to remember the history. Part of that race involved,
was it Chief Judge Breitel?123
Luke Biennan:
Breitel.
Peter Galie:
Was Breitel angry with what was happening and did somebody
get nailed on the bench?
Luke Bierman:
Harold Stevens. 124
Peter Galie:
Was he an Afro-American? Some concern about this process,
in fact having a material affect, not just on an Afro-American,
but the process itself, of knocking people off in the Populistic
kind of system. The concerns here, seem to me to be not entirely
intentional against the political interest of the party and the
Governor in that respect.
Luke Biennan:
There may be elements of that.
Peter Galie:
But there are other reasons.
123. Judge Breitel served on the New York Court of Appeals from 1966 to
1978, and served as Chief Judge from 1974 to 1978.
124. Harold Stevens was the first African-American to hold the position of
Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division's First Department. After serving
for 5 years, in 1974, he was appointed to the New York Court of Appeals to
fill an interim position, and was later defeated in the election for a full term.
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Luke Bierman:
Sure. Our experiences in other states indicate that different
kinds of people can win in all different kinds of systems, as the
studies show. There is not a whole lot of difference with the
kinds of people you get. I think if you keep digging and looking
at, for example, who gets to run, you will see that under the
elective system, you did not have multiple candidacies. People
ran and won or lost.
We do not have that in an appointed system. We have a bunch
of people who get nominated a bunch of times but never get
picked, indicating perhaps there are a bunch of nominees who fill
up the numbers when there is one person that the prevailing
party, the prevailing governor, wants.
Peter Galie:
You are suggesting that the groups recently had been calling for
a change in the selection of judges in New York, especially
downstate, because of the lack of both women and ethnic groups.
Would those changes not in fact result in changes they expect?
Luke Bierman:
It may well result in those changes because the selection system
that is utilized now does not produce a lot of diversity in the
kinds of people you get. That is what the literature shows,
certainly. 125 So, I do not think that if you change the system you
might not see more African-American, more Hispanics and more
women. You may very well see that, but it is not necessarily
because of the change in system. In fact, the studies indicate that
the numbers of those kinds of nontraditional judges, that
demographic diversity is occurring anyway, even with the
125. See N.Y. STATE COMM'N ON GOv'T INTEGRITY, BECOMING A JUDGE:
REPORT ON THE FAILINGS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN NEW YORK STATE (May
19, 1988).
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continued elective system. 126 There is some response. What the
concern was, and I think this is what your dissertation shows,
Carl, is that even with the elective system, the idea of popular
selection, there was none. It did not occur that way. That the
Governor or the political leaders were the ones actually selecting
who were going to be the candidates. The idea behind electing
judges was that we would have great accountability through the
electoral process and that simply was not occurring.
Vincent Bonventre:
Is quality, do you think, largely irrelevant in the change from
election to so-called merit selection?
Carl Swidorski:
What do you mean is it irrelevant?
Vincent Bonventre:
Do we think that the quality of the panel from the Court of
Appeals has improved or not, over the last few generations when
we went from election to the so-called merit selection? Has the
Court of Appeals improved the quality? As subjective as quality
might be, do you think it is improved?
Luke Bierman:
126. See N.Y. JUDICIAL COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, 1993
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON WOMEN IN THE
COURTS, (Nov. 26, 1993); N.Y. JUDICIAL COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE
COURTS, FIVE YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW YORK JUDICIAL COMMITTEE ON
WOMEN IN THE COURTS, (June 1991); N.Y. TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE
COURTS, UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE
ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS 244-48 (MAR. 31, 1986) (noting the under
representation of women in New York's highest judicial posts); N.Y. STATE
JUDICIAL COMM'N ON MINoRrrES, 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE
JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON MINORmES, Executive Summary, 94-95 (Apr.
1991) (concluding that "minorities are underrepresented on the bench.").
1996]
TOURO LAW REVIEW
The Constitution defines well qualified, I believe. It tells us
what well-qualified is under merit appointment.
Vincent Bonventre:
Do you think the court is better today than it was?
Luke Bierman:
That is a different question.
Vincent Bonventre:
I do not need to go back that far to Cardozo, but before the
election system, the Cooke court, the Breitel court, the Fuld
court, what have we had since then? The Wachtler court and now
we have the Kaye court.
Luke Bierman:
Based on what we said today it does not sound like we think
too much of these folks with regard to their state constitutional
adjudication.
Vincent Bonventre:
We probably would have said the same thing twenty years ago.
Peter Galie:
The problem with modem social science, is when social science
makes an assumption we cannot qualify. Political science is
uncomfortable making judgments about the noble or the virtuous.
Vincent Bonventre:
I am a social scientist. I will go out on a limb. The courts were
better before the appointment system.
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Barry Latzer:
There is one way to do it. They do these surveys of the
constitutional historians and ask them who are the best judges and
who are the worst judges.
Peter Galie:
Yes, this amazes me. This is just taking a popular opinion poll
except of experts. That is what we do.
Luke Biennan:
Would anybody argue the court is not as good as in Cardozo's
day? That Cardozo's court is the paradigm state court?
Vincent Bonventre:
Would anybody argue what?
Luke Biernan:
That the court is not at a level, it is not respected nationally,
the way it was in Cardozo's day. Is the Cardozo court sort of the
paradigm of a state court, of a quality state court?
Certainly that is what citation studies would tend to indicate. 12 7
Cardozo is sort of the common law epitome that we all use as the
example. I do not think anyone would disagree this court is not
that, but no court is because Cardozo's is the paradigm.
Barry Latzer:
Who are the rest of them?
127. See John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An
Empirical Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in
1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 381, 401-03 (1977); John Henry
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Luke Bierman:
Andrews. 12 8
Peter Galie:
Was Lehman 129 on the court?
Vincent Bonventre:
Andrews, Pound, 1 30 Lehman, there is a court!
Luke Biennan:
Judge Medina said arguing before the New York Court of
Appeals in the '40's was like appearing before a graduate seminar
in law. We do not get the sense that something similar is going
on there. Certainly we did not give it that sense.
Vincent Bonventre:
I thank you, panelists. Thank you members of the audience.
And Rob, do you have some farewell remarks?
Merryman, The Authority of Authority; What the California Supreme Court
Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 667-68 (1954).
128. Judge William S. Andrews served on the court of appeals from 1921 -
1928.
129. Judge Irving Lehman served on the court of appeals from 1933 - 1945.
130. Judge Cuthbert W. Pound served on the court of appeals from 1915 -
1934.
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Robert Heverly:
Just farewell, everybody. Thanks very much for coming. I
hope you enjoyed it. If you have comments or suggestions, feel
free to talk or to write to me. We would love to hear them. And
we appreciate everybody coming to our lovely city and we hope
to see you all again.
